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Abstract
This paper presents a bibliographical review of definitions, classifications and
applications concerning cyber attacks in networked control systems (NCSs)
and cyber-physical systems (CPSs). This review tackles the topic from a
control-oriented perspective, which is complementary to information or com-
munication ones. After motivating the importance of developing new meth-
ods for attack detection and secure control, this review presents security ob-
jectives, attack modeling, and a characterization of considered attacks and
threats presenting the detection mechanisms and remedial actions. In order
to show the properties of each attack, as well as to provide some deeper in-
sight into possible defense mechanisms, examples available in the literature
are discussed. Finally, open research issues and paths are presented.
Keywords: Cyber-physical systems, networked control systems, cyber
attacks, attack detection, secure control.
1. Introduction
With the advent of networks, the use of feedback control loops closed
via communication networks has replaced traditional point-to-point control
systems, giving birth to the concept of networked control systems (NCSs)
[1]. An NCS connects the cyber space to the physical space, so that the
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execution of several tasks is allowed remotely [2]. Compared with traditional
control systems, NCSs have several advantages, such as low installation and
maintenance costs, high reliability, increased system flexibility, and decreased
wiring [3].
Strictly connected with NCSs, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have at-
tracted the attention of the research community, due to the need for a better
integration of computation and physical processes. The term cyber-physical
was first used by Helen Gill at the National Science Foundation in the USA
[4] in order to indicate the presence of discrete processing and communica-
tion of information (cyber) together with the engineered system (physical).
Although the related terminology is quite new, the emergence of this class
of systems can be seen as the continuation of the technological evolution
that began in the 18th century, when the first notions of feedback control
(e.g., the steam engine governor) were applied during the Industrial Revolu-
tion [5]. Its first vision dates back to 1926, when Nikola Tesla described the
teleautomation concept1 [6], which is becoming true nowadays thanks to the
widespread availability of smart-phones and similar devices. The same term
cyber-physical systems comes from the root of the word cybernetics, which
was coined by Norbert Wiener to define the interdisciplinarity of automatic
control when applied to engineering, systems control, computer science, bi-
ology, neuroscience, philosophy and the organization of society.
In the same way as the frequency domain approach [7–9] and the state-
space approach [10–12] can be seen as the theoretical foundations for the
first and second generation of control systems, the development of CPSs can
be seen as the arising of a third generation of control systems. Given the
distributed nature of CPSs, it is natural to study them using techniques from
the domain of NCSs [13]. Actually, both concepts are so closely related that
it is hard to identify a clear frontier between them. The main difference
comes especially from the different emphasis given to control in the case of
1When wireless is perfectly applied the whole earth will be converted into a huge brain,
which in fact it is, all things being particles of a real and rhythmic whole. We shall be
able to communicate with one another instantly, irrespective of distance. Not only this,
but through television and telephony we shall see and hear one another as perfectly as
though we were face to face, despite intervening distances of thousands of miles; and the
instruments through which we shall be able to do this will be amazingly simple compared






Figure 1: General architecture of a cyber physical system.
NCSs and to the component interconnection in the case of CPSs.
Modern NCSs and CPSs have revolutionized several areas, and have been
used with success in many sectors, as resumed in Table 1. In its simplest
form, a CPS consists of actuators, physical plant, sensors and controllers,
interconnected by a communication network (see Fig. 1). Several architec-
tures have been proposed to describe the data flow, and to adapt to the issues
that arise depending on the field of application [14]. The most common ar-
chitecture for CPSs is divided into seven layers : i) physical; ii) data link;
iii) network; iv) transport; v) session; vi) presentation; and vii) application.
However, alternative architectures have been proposed in the literature or in
different drafts by standardization organizations, such as: service-based [15],
event-oriented [16], information-centric [17], and machine-to-machine (M2M)
[18], just to name a few.
The integration between cyber and physical components increases the
efficiency of NCSs and CPSs but, at the same time, introduces the risk of
cyber attacks, i.e., actions that exploit the system’s vulnerabilities and result
in some kind of damage. Cyber attacks can be malicious (trojan horses, com-
puter worms, sabotage attacks) or unintentional (incorrect software updates,
erroneous protocols, or unwanted network connections), and may occur in the
cyber space, the physical world, or in both. The motivation for malicious at-
tacks may arise from terrorism, geopolitics, criminality, or social issue driven
organizations.
Over the past decade, many concerns have been raised about the vulnera-





Due to recent advances in medical sensors [19, 20], CPSs are potential
candidates for healthcare applications [21] in which the patient’s condi-
tions can be observed remotely, and appropriate actions can be taken
regardless of his or her location [22, 23]. Notable examples of healthcare
applications are: electrical medical records (EMR) [24], LiveNet [25],
HipGuard [26], MobiHealth [27], CodeBlue [28] and Health-CPS [29],
just to name a few.
Energy systems
The systematic embedding of cyber technologies in order to adapt to
new challenges and exhibit adaptive performance such as flexibility, ef-
ficiency, sustainability, reliability and security, has changed significantly
energy systems, converting them into cyber-physical energy systems
[30, 31]. Examples of energy applications are: zero-net energy build-




In this case, the application of CPSs is motivated by the wish to achieve
efficient and safe transportation. Since people are a key element in
smart transportation problems [35], appropriate behavior information
need to be integrated with the physical information. Smart transporta-
tion applications based on CPSs are: traffic control systems [35], car
merging assistants [36], traffic flow control [37], traffic delay estimation
[38], traffic flow dynamics [39] and vehicle tracking systems [40].
Automotive
Autonomous driving is an appealing emerging CPS technology, in which
motion planning, sensor fusion, computer vision and other artificial in-
telligence algorithms are run in real-time inside a car [41]. Examples
and challenges of the application of CPSs in the automotive domain can
be found in [42–44].
Industrial process
control
CPSs provide broad control capacity over complex industrial processes
by exploiting the available network architecture of sensors, actuators and
processors [45]. Many production control systems are made by several
autonomous control systems, denoted as stages, and CPSs help in avoid-
ing that the failure of a stage brings down the entire production line.
Notably, CPSs are one of the key pieces of the Industry 4.0 paradigm
[46], which refers to the deep integration of next generation information
technologies into industrial scenarios, solutions and procedures [14].
Air transportation
By injecting cyber-physical interaction, e.g. by means of satellite-based
aircraft navigation, trajectory-based flight operations, or sharing of air-
craft position monitoring data, flights can be performed in an optimal
and highly precise time [47], future aircraft maintenance processes can
be improved, and the overall emissions for greener performances [48].
Water
infrastructures
The breakthrough represented by CPSs has affected several water-based
infrastructures, such as reservoirs [49], water and wastewater treatment
plants [50] and water distribution systems [51]. These CPSs exploit the
interaction between the physical water assets and the networked devices
which were designed to monitor, operate and supervise the physical
processes, such as sensor networks [52–54], mobile sensors [55] and smart
meters [56, 57].
Other applications
CPSs have found applications in many other fields, among which: smart
buildings [58], social networks and gaming [59, 60], cloud computing [61],
surveillance [62], search engines [63], civil engineering [64], and robotics
[65].
Table 1: Existing applications of CPSs.
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As remarked by [66], the consequences of a successful attack on control net-
works can be more damaging than attacks on other networks, because control
systems are at the core of many critical infrastructures. Attacks against med-
ical CPSs can harm or kill patients by reprogramming the devices [67] (e.g.,
an attacker might program an infusion pump to administer a larger than nec-
essary dose of medicine [22]), or prevent them from performing their tasks
[68]. Recent history provides several examples of cyber attacks on electric
infrastructures, which illustrate the threat that they represent, and show the
necesity to investigate about prevention and protection from them [69]. In
2007, the Department of Defense of the United States conducted an exper-
iment where a replica of a power plant control system was hacked, causing
a generator to self-destroy [70]. In 2008, Ira Winkler (a penetration-testing
consultant) and a team of other experts took a day to launch an attack on a
power company’s desktops, taking over several machines and obtaining the
ability to hack into the control network, thus overseeing power production
and distribution [71]. At the same time, a study of the Government Ac-
countability Office of the United States showed that the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) was vulnerable to cyber attacks that could sabotage criti-
cal systems that provide electricity to more than 8.7 million people, due to
several weak configurations, such as bad configured firewalls, lack of effective
virus protection and weak passwords [72]. Moreover, in March 2008, a unit
of the Hatch power plant (Georgia, United States) was forced into an emer-
gency shutdown for 48 hours after a software update was installed on a single
computer. When the computer rebooted, the lack of data in the system was
interpreted as a drop in the reactor’s cooling water, which was treated by
the plant as a severe failure [73].
It is relevant to recall that the Tennessee Eastman process (a continuous,
nonlinear two-phase reactor [74]) has been used to analyse the effects of at-
tacks in the process control domain, with some experimental work conducted
by [75] and [76]. In [77], process diagnostic for the Tennessee Eastman plant,
i.e. testing and evaluating its performance and reaction to new or unknown
conditions, was performed in such a way that the resilience against cyber-
physical assaults could be tested. In particular, various integrity, denial of
service (DoS) and situational awareness attacks were considered. A remark-
able attack to a water distribution facility happened in 2000 at Maroochy
Water Services (Queensland, Australia), affecting the SCADA of a sewage
system, which caused the release of almost 1 million liters of wastewater into
waterways and parks [78]. Other relevant incidents are the Pennsylvania Wa-
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ter Company hack in 2006, as well as the Florida’s Key Largo Wastewater
Treatment District hack, and the computer malfunction blamed for major
sewage spill into the Tijuana River in 2012 [79]. These events have moti-
vated a lot of recent research on cyber security in water systems, see e.g.
the works about automated canal networks [80, 81], the synergic security for
water networks [82], water distribution networks [83], and the creation of
a water distribution testbed for motivating research in the design of secure
cyber-physical systems [84].
Further examples of cyber attacks affecting critical infrastructures are
listed in Table 2. NCSs and CPSs are likely to be affected by cyber attacks
and failures on their physical infrastructure and on their data management
or communication layer [93]. Their complexity and the heterogeneity of their
components have introduced significant difficulties to secure and protect them
[94]. At the same time, it is also difficult to trace, classify or identify the
threat, which may move or spread, and target multiple components of the
system. For this reason, research on cyber attacks and secure control has
found increasing interest since the end of the last century. As a matter of
fact, Fig. 2 shows the results provided by the database Scopus, where the
total number of papers in which several words related to cyber attacks2 were
searched among title, abstract and keywords. It can be seen clearly that this
research topic is currently in a phase of exponential growth.
Owing to this, we consider important to realize a bibliographic review on
the literature related to definitions, classifications and applications concern-
ing cyber attacks, with the purpose of shedding some lights on the origins,
challenges and advances in this topic, and helping the research community
to develop new strategies that can increase resilience to possible threats. In
particular, this review will tackle the topic from a control-oriented perspec-
tive and, as such, the topic of security from the informatics or communication
point of view will not be explored. The reader interested in these other per-
spectives is referred to available surveys in the literature, such as [95–97].
This review is structured as depicted in Fig. 3.
2Cyber attacks, denial of service, replay attacks, false data injection attacks, zero dy-
namics attacks, covert attacks and secure control.
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The first known cyber security incident involving a critical infrastructure.
The attacker inserted a trojan horse into the SCADA system; the result was






A fired employee managed to disable emergency alert protocols in 22 states in
the United State of America and six unspecified areas of Canada were on risk.
The attacker hacked into the computer in New York and San José, California,
and reconfigured them so that they would crash [87].
Worcester, MA
Airport (1997)
A hacker entered and disabled a telephone computer that served the Worcester
Airport in Massachusetts. As a result, many services such as the aviation
control tower, the fire department, security, and various private airfreight
companies, were disabled for six hours [87].
Gazprom
(1999)
A hacker penetrated into Gazprom, a gas company in Russia; the hackers
used a trojan horse to gain control of the central switchboard, which controls




A computer virus named Sobig shut down train signalling systems in Florida,
U.S. It shut down the signalling, dispatching and other systems at CSX Cor-
poration. There were no major incidents caused by this event, but trains were
delayed [88].
Stuxnet (2010)
This worm infected industrial computer systems, compromised PLC, and tried
to destroy centrifuges by frequently switching the speed, which ultimately led




Five global energy and oil firms were targeted by a combination of attacks
including social engineering, trojans and Windows-based exploits. These at-
tacks, which have been ongoing for over two years, although did not affect
directly any SCADA system, allowed the attackers to exfiltrate data such as
operational blueprints [88].
Flame (2012)
A piece of malware operating in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, the West Bank
and other places in the Middle East and North Africa for at least two years
was used to extract documents and open a backdoor to infected systems, that
allowed the attackers to tweak the toolkit and add new functionality [90].
Havex (2014)
This malware was earlier reported to have specific interest in the energy sector
and, during the spring of 2014, in industrial control systems. The group
behind it used an innovative trojan horse approach to compromise victims.
A trojanized software installer dropped and executed this file as a part of
the normal installation. The user was left with a working system, but the





Power plants experienced unscheduled power outages impacting a large num-
ber of customers. There were also reports of malware found in Ukrainian com-
panies in a variety of critical infrastructure sectors. Public reports indicate
that the Black Energy malware was discovered on the companies computer
networks [92].
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Figure 3: Structure of the review.
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2. Security objectives and attack modeling
Recent studies have shown that there is a growing interest in security for
CPSs [98–107] in order to detect, respond and recover an NCS or a CPS after
a cyber attack has happened. Such an interest has materialized in a number
of applications from different fields, such as medical devices [67], smart grids
[102], industrial control systems [108] and transportation systems [109], and
has lead to the development of new CPS architectures with enhanced security
and robustness [110].
The concept of security was first introduced in the book [111] as a prop-
erty which characterizes control systems affected by intentional malicious
faults, i.e., cyber attacks. Since then, a lot of research on security has been
performed that, according to [112], can be divided into two big categories:
information security which, by focusing on encryption and data security, pro-
vides methods that are effective on software layers of NCSs and CPSs, with-
out using any physical model [113]; and secure control theory, which studies
how cyber attacks affect the control system’s physical dynamics [114]. As
stated by [112], the safety tools provided by information security need to be
complemented by secure control theory which, being based on attack mod-
els and a description of the interaction between the physical world and the
control system, allows a better understanding of the consequences of the
attacks, and the development of new detection methods, algorithms and ar-
chitectures, that make the control systems more resilient to possible attacks
and failures.
The main target related to security is to design estimation and control
algorithms that protect operational goals such as closed-loop stability, safety,
reliability, or the optimization of some performance function, but also non-
operational goals such as the date information from an attacker who wishes to
disrupt the system. There are several definitions of security properties, with
slight variations [115]. However, the most established definition of security is
as the combination of three primary attributes, known by the acronym CIA
(confidentiality, integrity and availability) [116]:
• Confidentiality: it refers to the ability to keep the information hid-
den from unauthorized users. A lack of confidentiality results in a
disclosure of information, which is a circumstance or event whereby an
entity gains access to information for which it is not authorized [117].
Achieving confidentiality in a control system would prevent an adver-
sary from inferring the state of the physical system by eavesdropping
10
on the communication channels between the sensors and the controller,
and between the controller and the actuators [118];
• Integrity: it refers to the capability of achieving operational goals
by preventing, detecting, or blocking attacks on the information sent
and received by the sensors, the actuators or the controllers [119]. In
the context of control systems, integrity refers to the trustworthiness
of sensor and control data packets. A lack of integrity results in de-
ception, i.e., in a component receiving false data (such as incorrect
measurements, incorrect time stamps, or incorrect sender identity) and
believing it to be true [66];
• Availability: it is the property of the system or the system’s com-
ponents (sensors, controllers and actuators) to be accessible, usable or







Figure 4: Security goals of CPSs.
Note that these three properties are necessary for achieving security in
NCSs and CPSs, but they are not sufficient. In fact, according to [120],
another set of properties, known by the acronym AAA, is needed in order to
achieve security:
• Authentication: it is needed to ensure that the data, transactions,
and the communications are original. Furthermore, it is important to
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validate that all the implicated sides are who they claim to be [118] and
not, e.g., impostors. According to [119], authentication in CPSs must
be obtained in all the related processes, such as sensing, communication
and actuation;
• Authorization: it provides the permission or approval to specific tech-
nology resources (e.g., access to the control unit, server, etc.), once the
authentication has been performed;
• Accounting: it provides tracking of events, allowing to check the
record of the possible activities carried out in the system (e.g., see
at what time, location and who has performed an activity).
These properties are the main goals to achieve security, as shown in Fig. 4.
Research challenges about security in control systems have been highlighted
in [114], while [121] and [122] have provided surveys concerning topics related
to security, presenting some trends and current efforts in securing the next
generation of systems.
Cyber attacks consist in computer actions in remote or local connection
(as e.g. program executions) which aim at compromising the security of the
system by affecting one or more security attributes [123]. Notably, when it
comes to the development of secure control theory, only the three primary at-
tributes CIA have been considered, such that the attention on the secondary
attributes AAA has been restricted so far to information security. Distin-
guishing features of cyber attacks, which differentiate them from faults, are
that they appear in the system without any signs or hints of a failure, they
are performed in an intelligent manner, with a purpose (such as sabotage or
theft), and they have the ability of spreading within seconds. According to
[124], the attackers usually wish to disrupt the measurements or the physical
states in the control system, while avoiding being detected by the monitoring
systems, which is usually achieved by maximizing the time between the be-
ginning of the attack and its detection. The impact of cyber attacks has been
investigated in [125–128], where some insight into the impact of cyber secu-
rity have been presented, while an asset-based dynamic impact assessment
has been developed in [129].
The literature on cyber attacks is fairly new, and many classifications have
been proposed, see e.g. the ones provided by [66, 129, 130]. A successful clas-
sification is the one proposed by [131, 132], who introduced the attack space
as a three dimensional graphical characterization of the attacks. The three
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dimensions correspond to the attacker’s a priori knowledge of the system’s
model, the disruption resources and the disclosure resources. The knowledge
of the system’s model allows the attacker to develop sophisticated attacks,
which have more severe consequences and are harder to detect. The disclo-
sure resources let the attacker obtain sensitive informations, but cannot be
used to disrupt the system operation in order to cause damage. Conversely,
the disruption resources can be used to affect the system operation.
Finally, in order to describe comprehensively the attacks, two elements
are needed: a mathematical model of the control system and a description
of the attack policy. Following [124], a CPS can be described as a descriptor
system [133]3:
Eẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + Fw(t) (1)
y(t) = Cx(t) +Dw(t) (2)
where x is the state, u is the control input (actuator signals), y is the output
(sensor data), A, B, C, D, E, F are matrices of appropriate dimensions
(with E possibly singular), and w(t) is a signal which is used to describe the
effect of cyber attacks on the control system.
On the other hand, the attack policy [131] describes the adversary model,
and is defined as:
a(t) = [ũ(t), ỹ(t)] = h (S, u(t), y(t)) (3)
where a(t) is the attack vector at time t, S represents the system knowledge
including the physical plant, the controller and the detector, while ũ(t) and
ỹ(t) are the corrupted sensor and actuator, which is used in the equations
(1)-(2) instead of u(t) and y(t), respectively.
In this review, along with the classification proposed by [131, 132] in terms
of the attack space, we propose an additional classification based on the model
(1)-(2) and the attack policy (3). This classification considers whether the
attack corrupts u(t) and y(t) into ũ(t) and ỹ(t), or if the attacker interacts
with the system by means of the signal w(t). In this way, another three
dimensional graphical characterization of the attacks can be obtained, which
will be referred to in the following as impact space.
3Note that a discrete-time setting can also be considered, see e.g. [131].
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3. Attack characterization, detection and remedial actions
This section provides a description of the possible attacks and threats,
as well as a detailed discussion about the results developed in the litera-
ture in order to characterize them, analyze their impact and suggest defense
mechanisms that allow detecting or counteracting them. Since this paper
aims at providing a review on cyber attacks from a control oriented per-
spective, the description of attacks concerning information security (such as
man-in-the-middle attacks [134], compromised key attacks [135] and routing
attacks [136]) will be omitted. Hence, five attacks will be described: i) denial
of service (DoS) attacks, ii) replay attacks, iii) false data injection attacks
(FDIAs), iv) zero dynamics attacks (ZDAs), and v) covert attacks, for which
Fig. 5, inspired by the work of [132], provides their positioning in terms of
the attack space while Fig. 6 provides their positioning with respect to the
impact space described in the previous section. Moreover, Table 3 provides
a classification of papers according to the application field. It is worth re-
marking that real events concerning cyber attacks are performed usually as a
combination of the simpler (and more ideal) cases described in the academic
literature4.
Table 3: Application fields
Application field References
Batch reactor system [138]







DoS attacks, also referred to as jamming attacks [215], prevent the actua-
tor and sensor data from reaching their respective destinations [66], resulting
in a loss of availability. In order to generate a DoS attack, once the attacker
4As a matter of example, the synchronized and coordinated cyber attack that caused
the 2015 Ukraine blackout used a combination of credential theft via phishing, DoS attack
and firmware attack in order to enable the primary attack, which used SCADA hijack














































Figure 6: Positioning of the five attacks in the impact space.
has gained access to the communication network, he/she can jam the commu-
nication channels, compromise devices and prevent them from sending data,
attack the routing protocols, flood with network traffic some devices, etc.
[66]. DoS attacks have been listed as one of the most financially expensive
security threats [216] and, according to a database on cyber incidents affect-









Figure 7: Example of DoS attack scenario.
For this reason, several case studies have been considered to analyze their
effects (see Table 4 for a resume of relevant works found in the literature).
As mentioned by [104], a DoS attack does not require any model knowledge
(S = ∅ according to the attack policy (3)) and does not causes disclosure of
the resources.
In Fig. 7, an example of DoS attack is presented, in which the attacker
prevents the plant from communicating with the controller. Note that DoS
attacks can result in either a complete lack of data or in the replacement
of the absent data with the last received/transmitted data. The first case,
referred to as zero-input strategy, has been considered by [221, 222] and,
following [223, 224], can be expressed by particularizing the attack policy (3)
as ỹ(t) = 0 or ũ(t) = 0 for DoS attacks affecting the sensors or the actuators,
respectively. On the other hand, the second case (hold-input strategy), has
been considered by [225, 226], and can be modeled as [132] ỹ(t) = yτy or
ũ(t) = uτu , where yτy and uτu are the last available sensor and actuator data,
respectively. Notably, [227] has studied the LQ performance of networked
control systems in both cases, and has showed that none of the two could be
claimed to be superior to the other, since one can find many scenarios where
one strategy performs better than the other, while there are scenarios where
the converse occurs. Since DoS attacks corrupt both u(t) and y(t), they are
placed on the sensors-actuators plane of the impact space depicted in Fig. 5.
In order to model the loss of information caused by DoS attacks, sev-
eral mathematical models have been proposed. The first steps towards un-
derstanding DoS attacks were rooted in networked control formulations of
16





The resilient voltage regulation of a UPS is performed by means of a hybrid-
theoretical framework, in which the controller switches in accordance with the
competing result of the cyber attacker and the defender. The output voltage




This work summarizes the results of four selected tests performed on automo-
tive systems based on CAN bus technology, among which two DoS scenarios:




This paper evaluates the physical and economic consequences of the attacks on
a chemical reactor system, revealing two important points: i) a DoS attack
does not have a significant effect when the reactor is in the steady state;
however, combining the DoS attack with an innocuous integrity attack, causes
the reactor to move to an unsafe state; ii) increasing the operational cost of




In January 2003, the Slammer worm struck the monitoring system of the
Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in the US, causing congestion that slowed
down the plant’s network, eventually crashing the safety-parameter display




Vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication make con-
nected vehicles vulnerable to cyber attacks. This paper, by proposing a real-
time scheme that can detect the occurrence of attacks, and estimate their
effect on the connected vehicle system, can be considered a first step towards
obtaining an attack-resilient control system.
packet drops caused by random events [228, 229], using relatively simple
models, such as the Bernoulli one, in which the attacker randomly jams a
measurement or control packet according to independent trials with given
success probability [66, 222, 230]. In fact, this simpler model was deemed to
be a good starting point for developing methodologies to perform risk sensi-
tive control under DoS attacks [231]. However, real DoS attacks change their
targets and strategies in response to the protective measures taken against
them, such that more advanced models were needed and later developed.
These models take into account the existence of limitations on the resources
of the attacker, which limits the number of times a transmission can be
blocked, as well as the attack duration. The reader can find a list of the
most significant DoS models, together with related works, in Table 5.
Table 5: DoS attacks - Mathematical models
Model type References Model type References
Bernoulli models
[66, 167, 222, 230,
231]
Periodic or PWM signals [232, 233]
Markov models [150, 234, 235] Unstructured signals [138, 236–240]
Queuing models [241] Time delay [151, 242]
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Several works have considered the problem of making a control system
resilient against DoS attacks, which could be achieved either by designing
control laws that are robust against the attacker’s actions [66] or, in case
sensor measurements are compromised, by means of secure state estimation
[152]. From a mathematical point of view, the problem can be characterized
as the one of finding an optimal control policy γ∗ among all the possible
control policies γ ∈ Γ such that for some cost function of interest J(γ, µ),
where µ ∈M denotes the possible attack policies:
J(γ∗, µ) ≤ J(γ, µ) ∀γ ∈ Γ,∀µ ∈M (4)
A list of strategies that have proven to be successful for achieving this
goal, and the related references, are provided in Table 6.
Table 6: DoS attacks - Resilient control strategies
Strategy References Strategy References
LQG control [66, 222, 243] Robust control [150, 151, 153, 235]
Risk sensitive control [231, 234] Event-triggered control [232, 233, 236–240, 244]
Conversely, the opposite problem is to consider the DoS attack from the
attacker point of view, meaning that optimal strategies for making the attack
efficient and hard to detect have been studied [230, 244–248] which, similarly
to the above, can be characterized as finding µ∗ ∈M such that:
J(γ, µ) ≤ J(γ, µ∗) ∀γ ∈ Γ,∀µ ∈M (5)
Note that in this case, the assumption that the attacker does not have
any physical knowledge about the plant can be relaxed to some extent, in
order to allow for some knowledge concerning the plant itself or the existing
implementation of secure control/anomaly detection techniques.
When the defender and the attacker are not studied independently, but
considered together, a race between the two entities arises (where the con-
troller is the minimizer and the attacker is the maximizer), which has an
equilibrium corresponding to some pair (γ∗, µ∗) ∈ Γ×M such that [243]:
J(γ∗, µ) ≤ J(γ, µ) ≤ J(γ, µ∗) ∀γ ∈ Γ,∀µ ∈M (6)
which can be found using elements from the game theory [153, 243, 249–252].
An alternative mechanism to increase the defense properties of a system
against DoS attacks is attack detection. Attack detection schemes expose the
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attacks after they happen by monitoring unexpected changes in the measured
variables [253]. The existing approaches can be classified mainly into two cat-
egories: pattern-based and anomaly-based. Pattern-based approaches (using,
e.g., on state transition analysis [254] or Petri nets [255]) compare real-time
data with available records of data corresponding to attack situations, hence
they are effective only in the case of known attacks, because new or slightly
modified old attacks would not have related data stored for comparison. On
the other hand, anomaly-based detection approaches detect deviations from
normal or expected behavior of the system, without any prior knowledge of
the attack. A list of techniques proposed for performing anomaly-based DoS
attack detection is given in Table 7.
Table 7: DoS attacks - Anomaly-based detection techniques
Strategy References Strategy References
Statistical methods [256–259] Data mining [260–263]
Artificial intelligence [264–270] Information theoretic [271]
For a comprehensive review on this attack and a discussion of the poten-
tial research directions on this topic, the reader is referred to [272, 273]. It is
also worth recalling that a lot of recent literature on DoS attacks has focused
on a specific kind referred to as distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. DDoS at-
tacks follow the same pattern as DoS attacks, but they are coordinated across
many hijacked systems (zombies) by a single attacker (master), thanks to
the use of botnets5 [274]. As remarked by [216], techniques that detect DoS
attacks also apply to DDoS attacks. The interested readers can find extensive
surveys on DDoS attacks in [253, 273, 275–277], and the references therein.
3.2. Replay attacks
Replay attacks are a type of deception attacks in which the adversary
replaces the real-time measurements coming from the sensors, or the con-
trol actions sent to the actuators, with previously recorded data. This at-
tack is often depicted in movies, in which security videos are recorded and
later replayed to hide thefts or sabotages. Other examples are the inter-
ception of smart grids’ usage patterns by hijacking smart meters in order
5A botnet is a wide chain of hundreds or thousands of remotely controlled compromised
hosts (zombies or bots or slave agents) under the control of one or more intruders to attack
a particular victim [120, 253].
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Figure 8: Example of a replay attack.
to produce inaccurate predictions of energy consumption [168, 169] and the
famous Stuxnet case, in which a worm recorded the sensor values in the
attacked uranium enrichment facility for twenty-one seconds, and replayed
those twenty-one seconds in a constant loop during the attack, in order to
keep it undetected by alarm routines and officials in the control room [278].
This type of attack is carried out in two stages (see Fig. 8):
1. In the first stage, the attacker collects the data without disturbing the
system, such that ũ(t) = u(t) and ỹ(t) = y(t). Note that this stage has
been often referred to in the literature as eavesdropping attack [279];
2. In the second stage, the attacker begins to replay the collected data such
that the attack policy (3) becomes ũ(t) = u(t + t0 − t1 − (Nf − 1)w)
or ỹ(t) = y(t+ t0 − t1 − (Nf − 1)w) for attacks in the input and in the
output, respectively, where t0 is the time at which the recording of the
data started, w is the size of the attack window, t1 is the time at which
the attacker begins to replay the collected data, and Nf indicates the
number of repetitions of the recorded sequence.























Figure 9: Block diagram representing a replay attack.
with some corresponding input matrix Ba, which can be used to inject an
external input ua(t) and achieve some malicious objective, for instance, to
cause physical damage to the attacked plant [280]. As stated by [281], the
attacker does not need knowledge about the attacked system, except for being
aware of the fact that the system itself will be in steady-state during the
attack (S = ∅). However, in case the external input ua(t) could be injected,
some knowledge of the system model (for example, S = {Tya(s)}, where
Tya(s) denotes the transfer function from the input ua(t) to the output y(t))
would allow a smart design of the input signal ua(t), which better achieves
the malicious objective [280]. Since replay attacks can corrupt both u(t) and
y(t), they are placed on the sensors-actuators plane of the impact space. In
particular, the position of replay attacks w.r.t. DoS attacks in Fig. 6 aims
at highlighting that most of the works found in the literature consider the
case of replay attacks affecting the sensors rather than the actuators.
According to [282], there are three ways to perform a replay attack: i)
in open-loop, if after disconnecting the actuator/sensor signal, the attacker
sends all the recorded signal; ii) through bias injection, if the actuator/sensor
is kept in the loop, but the attacker injects the difference between the real
signal and the recorded signal; and iii) using an internal model, if the attacker
inserts an internal model block which generates the repeated signal. Fig. 9
shows an example of block diagram for a replay attack performed through an
internal model. In this case, the internal model generates fake measurements
ỹ(t) using a pre-registered initial condition x̃(0) and previously recorded con-
trol inputs ũ(t). Then, the difference between the real measurements y(t) and
the generated ones ỹ(t), denoted as Dw(t) following the notation introduced
in (1)-(2), is injected into the sensors.
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From the defender point of view, the actions to perform to face a replay
attack vary depending on whether the attack is affecting the actuators or
the sensors. While in the first case, it is possible to design control strategies
which achieve resilience against the attack, see e.g. [202, 283], in the second
case resilience is based on secure distributed fusion estimation, as detailed
in [170]. In all these works, an assumption about the existence of energy
constraints, which limit the maximum number of consecutive repetitions of
the recorded sequence, was stated. Since in many scenarios, this assumption
does not hold, much of the available literature has focused on replay attack
detection, with the goal of shutting down the controlled plant as soon as
a malicious behavior has been detected. The approaches available in the
literature can be classified roughly into two categories (see Table 8).
Table 8: Replay attack detection - Existing approaches
Approach References Approach References
Watermarking-based [203, 280, 281, 284–286] Alternative methods [287, 288]
In the watermarking-based approaches, an authentication signal is added
to the signal sent to the actuators (at the cost of sacrificing the control perfor-
mance), and the received sensor measurements are analyzed to check whether
there is or there is not the effect of the authentication signal on the physical
system. If the attacker is unaware of the watermark or if he/she does not
have enough knowledge about the plant’s model, he/she is unable to pro-
vide a consistent output to be replayed. In [281], the authentication signal
was drawn from an independent and identically distributed (IID) Gaussian
distribution. [280] investigated further the problem of designing the optimal
watermark signal in the class of stationary Gaussian processes, i.e. a gener-
alization of the IID distribution, while satisfying constraints on the control
performance. [284] considered a more advanced adversary, who could use
knowledge of the system as well as access to a subset of the control inputs
and sensor outputs to construct stealthy replayed outputs. In this case, it
was shown that a Neyman-Pearson detector was optimal, in the sense of
maximizing the probability of determining whether an attack has occurred
for a given probability of false alarm. With the aim of reducing the negative
effect on the closed-loop performance, while guaranteeing the detection per-
formance, [203] proposed to employ a periodic watermarking strategy. The
watermark considered by [285] aims at destabilizing the difference between
the estimated and measured output of the system (residual), while preserving
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the stability of the main system. On the other hand, the authentication sig-
nature used by [289, 290] is a sinusoidal signal with a time-varying frequency.
Finally, a multi-agent extension of this concept was provided by [286], under
the assumption that the watermarking signals could be shared among the
agents through the network, which gives more degrees of freedom to detect
the replay attack, thus resulting in better detection performance.
On the other hand, the alternative methods try to detect replay attacks
without injecting signals in the control input. [287] assumed that the actu-
ation and sensing signals were transmitted over an additive white Gaussian
noise channel, and showed that the information distortion induced by the
channel could play a similar role to the injected watermark. Such distortion
could be studied by means of spectral estimation techniques, thus providing
a viable detector for replay attacks. On the other hand, the approach devel-
oped by [288] inserted a nonlinear element in the control loop and exploited
the theory of the describing function to design robust harmonic oscillations,
which could be used for achieving the replay attack detection.
3.3. False data injection attacks (FDIAs)
The concept of FDIAs, in which the attacker injects malicious measure-
ments to mislead the state estimation process [171], was first developed by
[172]. This type of attack can be formulated against systems with unsta-
ble modes, in order to make them unobservable by means of an appropriate
modification of the system measurements [291]. An exemplification of FDIA
suggested by [292] is shown in Fig. 10, where the attacker corrupts the
measurements in order to make the mode corresponding to the eigenvalue λ
unobservable from the measurements. Obviously, if λ has positive real part,
hiding this mode can lead to catastrophic consequences, since the controller
would not be able anymore to stabilize the plant.
In its most basic form, an FDIA can be described by particularizing the
attack policy (3) as ũ(t) = u(t) and ỹ(t) = y(t) + ya(t), where ya(t) is the
malicious data added to the original measurements, thus constraining its po-
sition in the impact space to lie on the sensors axis. By denoting as x̃(t)
and x̂(t) the state estimates obtained using ỹ(t) and y(t), respectively, the
attacker can use knowledge about the relationship between state variables
and sensor measurements (S = {C}) in order to construct ya(t) such that
x̃(t) = x̂(t) +k(t), where k(t) reflects the estimation error injected by the at-

















Figure 10: Block diagram representing an FDIA.
holds:
‖ỹ(t)− Cx̃(t)‖ = ‖y(t)− Cx̂(t)‖ (7)
such that the attacker can bypass existing bad measurement detection tech-
niques.
Note that several works have relaxed the assumption that S = {C}, in
order to take into account uncertainties in the system information gathered
by the hacker, see e.g. [173–175]. Moreover, commonly analyzed scenarios
involve cases where the attacker has limited access to sensors or limited
resources to compromise them [172].
The research on FDIAs has focused on three main aspects [293]: theo-
retical research on constructing a valid FDIA, application research on the
impacts of FDIAs, and defensive research, in which the key point is propos-
ing defense strategies from the viewpoint of the system operator (see Table
9 for an overview).
3.3.1. Theoretical research on constructing FDIAs
Theoretical research on constructing FDIAs starts from relaxing the as-
sumption that the attacker has gathered perfect knowledge about the sys-
tem’s output matrix C and he/she has access to all the measurements for ma-
nipulation. For this reason, several works have focused on designing FDIAs
taking into account the existence of constraints and the availability of partial
and imperfect information about the system. Early works have considered
the case in which the attacker has full knowledge about the system, but has
the ability to hack only a limited number of sensors [171, 172, 176]. In this
situation, a relevant research problem is the one of constructing a valid FDIA
by minimizing the number of attacked sensors, which has been solved using
mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) [178], matching pursuit [172] or
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Table 9: Overview of FDIA research.
Research Description References
The attacker has full knowledge about the system, but
he/she can hack only a limited number of sensors.
[171, 172, 176–178]
Theoretical
The attacker has incomplete information about the
system








The attacker has to deal with a nonlinear system [173, 182, 183]
Analysis of security indexes to quantify the effort re-
quired to launch an FDIA
[184]
Application Economic attacks in electricity markets [100, 141–149]
research on the
impact of Load redistribution attacks in power systems [155, 156]
FDIAs
Energy deceiving attacks in energy routing processes [185]
Protection- Locate and protect a set of basic measurements [157, 158, 171, 186]
based defense
strategies Apply phasor measurement units (PMUs) [159, 160, 187–189]
Design-centric (DeC) approaches
[196, 197, 204, 205,
294, 295]
Detection-
based defense Data-centric (DaC) approaches




[162, 163, 190, 191,
194, 199–201, 297–301]
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least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) [177]. Later re-
search has established that it is possible for an attacker to launch valid
FDIAs even with incomplete information about the system. For example,
[179] have shown that such information can be estimated using a combina-
tion of off-line data collection, during which the attacker collects the system
information manually, and online data collection performed using hacked sen-
sors. In the context of energy price regulation, [139] showed that the system
topology could be recovered based solely on publicly available market data,
upon observing successive outcomes of the linear programs usually employed
to calculate real-time energy prices. On the other hand, [140] proposed an in-
dependent component analysis (ICA) algorithm that could extract topology
information from the correlations among different measurements. Moreover,
[180] showed that an FDIA can be launched on a subsystem without needing
to know any network information about other subsystems in the network.
[154] has considered an FDIA performed by a malicious software based on
local information and measurements from its host substation, showing that
artificial intelligence in the form of reinforcement learning can be used to
learn how to conduct the attack. Very recently, the case in which the topol-
ogy is being falsified, i.e. not only continuous data but also discrete data can
be manipulated by the attacker (e.g. the on-off status of switching devices),
has been considered, see e.g. [181]. Further topics of theoretical research on
FDIAs are the nonlinear case, usually exemplified through AC power flow
models [173, 182, 183], and the analysis of security indexes to quantify the
least effort required to launch FDIAs without triggering bad-bata detection
alarms [184].
3.3.2. Application research on the impact of FDIAs
Application research on the impacts of FDIAs has been conducted to
study how these attacks affect the electricity market, power system operation,
and distributed energy routing [293].
In order to integrate renewable sources and promote economic energy
efficiency in smart grids, real-time electrical market mechanisms have been
adopted with the goal to balance supply and load, clear market prices and
maintain grid stability [302]. Through these mechanisms, the electricity price
is updated periodically based on real-time power generation and consumption
status, thus reducing over-provisioning and increasing the efficiency [303].
However, the deregulated energy market is vulnerable to FDIAs, by means
of which the attacker can introduce errors and affect its operation. This type
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of FDIA, which has been referred to as economic attack has been addressed
by several works. [141, 142] were the first works to investigate the impact of
FDIAs on power market. The evaluation of the generated market revenues
and their maximization were studied by [100, 143]. Control theory was used
by [144] with the goal of analyzing the effect of economic attacks on pricing
stability. The relations between attackers and defenders within electricity
prizing were modeled as a zero-sum game by [145]. Recently, the assumption
that the attacker has full knowledge about the targeted power system has
been relaxed by a few works, see e.g. [146–148]. A scenario based on the
Australian electricity market trading mechanism has been analyzed by [149],
showing that economic attacks pose no security threats to power systems,
but mislead the customers to pay higher electricity bills. The power system
operation can be affected by load redistribution attacks [155, 156], which aim
at disrupting the security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) in such a
way that the system is driven to an uneconomic operating state. On the other
hand, the energy deceiving attack is a type of FDIA that affects the energy
routing process, potentially creating an imbalance between the demand and
the supply, which can increase the cost of the energy distribution and disrupt
its effectiveness [185].
3.3.3. Defensive research on FDIAs
The defensive research can be classified broadly into two categories [304],
i.e. protection-based approaches [157, 171, 305] and detection-based ap-
proaches [190–194, 196, 197, 204, 294, 295]. In the first case, the system
is protected from FDIAs by identifying critical sensors and ensuring their
security by encryption. These methods suffer from two drawbacks [161]: i)
the decrease of redundancy, because only the protected measurements are
trusted and used; and ii) the protection might not be secure all of the time,
since the attackers could penetrate the protection and manipulate the mea-
surements. In particular, the works [172, 176] have demonstrated that it is
necessary and sufficient to protect a set of basic measurements in order to be
able to defend against FDIAs. Hence, some works have focused on research-
ing how to locate and protect a set of basic measurements [157, 171, 186].
Other works have focused on applying phasor measurement units (PMUs),
which are devices equipped with GPS technology for precise timing [187, 188].
Measurements obtained with PMUs are harder to be compromised by an at-
tacker, although due to their high capital cost, they cannot be deployed on a
large scale. Hence, it is important to find the best locations to place PMUs so
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that their number can be minimized [159, 189]. The work [158] has focused
on designing the least-budget defense strategy to achieve protection against
FDIAs, investigating which sensors to be protected and how much defense
budget to be deployed on each of them. Notably, some recent research has
applied game theory to the case of FDIAs. For instance, [195] considered
multiple adversaries and a single defender, showing that by defending a very
small set of measurements, and taking into account that multiple attackers
play a destructive role towards each other by carrying out attacks that can-
cel each other out, an equilibrium in which the attacks have no effect on
the system can be achieved. On the other hand, [160] presented a two-layer
attack-defense model for an FDIA against PMUs, in which the upper layer
simulates the vulnerability of state estimation to the FDIA, and in the lower
layer a two-player zero-sum game is used to determine the dynamic optimal
strategy to protect and attack the PMUs.
Conversely, detection-based approaches aim at recognizing maliciously
altered measurements, e.g. analyzing the raw measurements and detecting
the ones that do not fit the distribution of historical data. Many detection-
based approaches rely on state-based invariants to identify deviations of the
plant from its normal behavior. Since this deviation is an anomaly, such
approaches are referred to as anomaly-based, and can be divided roughly
into two categories: design-centric (DeC) and data-centric (DaC) [205]. In
DeC approaches, plant design and component specifications are input to
an invariant generator, which uses fundamental laws of physics to generate
invariants. Subsequently, statistical quality control techniques such as the
cumulative sum control chart (CUSUM) [196, 197, 204, 294, 295] are used for
monitoring changes such that attacks can be detected. On the other hand, in
DaC approaches the invariants are generated via machine learning from plant
state data describing the normal behavior of the plant [192, 193, 198, 206–210,
296]. It is worth mentioning that some recent research [205] has demonstrated
the advantage of using a mix of DeC and DaC approaches, since this leads
to a richer set of invariants and thus a higher accuracy of attack detection
than when either approach is used without the other. Further approaches
that fall in the detection-based category are the ones based on the Kullback-
Leibler distance (KLD) [297], Markov graphs [191], Kalman filters [199],
sparse optimization [190], generalized likelihood ratio [194], state forecasting
[200], distributed observers [201, 298], sliding mode observers [299], principal
component analysis [300], topology perturbation [301] wavelet transforms and
deep neural networks [162]. Some recent work has focused also on enhancing
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the detectability and identifiability of FDIAs without introducing significant
operational cost, such as power losses on transmission lines [163]. The reader
is referred to [306] for a detailed review of FDIA detection-based approaches
with a qualitative comparison based on their properties.
3.4. Zero dynamics attacks (ZDAs)
ZDAs exploit the linearity of the plant as well as the existence of invariant
zeros in order to be undetectable. In particular, [124] proved that an attack is
undetectable if and only if it excites uniquely the zero dynamics of the input-
output relationship, and [164] gave necessary and sufficient graph-theoretic
conditions for the absence of zero dynamics, and hence for the absence of
undetectable attacks. A scheme of ZDA is given in Fig. 11, where the
attacker excites the zero dynamics of the plant by choosing appropriately the
signal Fw(t) such that it induces a state response xA(t) without producing a
change in the output signal (yA(t) = 0). Note that in this case S = {Tyw(s)}
since, in order to perform successfully the ZDA, the attacker needs to know
how the available signal w(t) affects the output y(t), while ũ(t) = u(t) and
ỹ(t) = y(t), due to the fact that the attacker does not modify directly either
signals. As a consequence, ZDAs are placed on the system axis of the impact
space.
ZDAs are particularly critical when the attacked plant has some nonmini-
mum phase zeros, since if the attacker knows the system model, then unstable
modes can be introduced in the state response without being noticed by any
type of detector. Worse yet, [165] has shown that even if the system model
is known only up to some uncertainty, the attacker can still employ robust
control techniques to construct a disturbance observer which generates an
auxiliary zero dynamics, thus replacing the role of the real zero dynamics.
Moreover, minimum phase plants are not completely safe from ZDAs: since
most CPSs consist of an integration between the continuous-time physical
plant and the discrete-time digital controller, they are sampled data sys-
tems. In the sampled data domain, unstable sampling zeros may be created
when the continuous-time plant has relative degree greater than two and the
sampling period is small, which happens in several critical infrastructures
such as nuclear power plants and smart grids [307].
Since ZDAs cannot be detected from the output signal, classical fault
detection strategies are useless to reveal these stealthy attacks, and alterna-















Figure 11: Block diagram representing a ZDA.
structure by changing actuators and sensors, as suggested by [308], who char-
acterized classes of changes that reveal attacks, as well as those that do not.
[309] noticed that multivariable zeros are linked to the input direction, which
can be influenced by adding a modulation block in front of the control input,
making harder to excite the zero dynamics of the system. The solution pro-
posed by [166] is based on the multi-rate operation of the sampler, showing
that if the sampler measures the system output more frequently than the
attacker expects, the ZDA may become detectable in the extended measure-
ments. In the case of sampled data systems, [307] proposed to make the
outcome of the ZDA less effective by making the plant be of minimum phase
through the use of a piecewise constant generalized hold.
Notably, some recent research has extended the notion of ZDA to stochas-
tic systems, for which zero dynamics, as defined mathematically in systems
theory, may not exist [310]. In this case, an attacker is defined to be stealthy
if there exists no detector that can perform better than a detector that makes
a decision by ignoring all the measurements and making a random guess to
decide whether an attack is in progress or not. In particular, the work [310]
characterizes some properties of such attacks, and quantifies the performance
degradation that an attacker that seeks to be undetected can introduce.
3.5. Covert attacks
The term covert agent was introduced by [211] to denote a malicious
agent who does not want to reveal to the controller that the CPS is being
compromised. In this reference, it was shown that, under the assumption
that the covert agent can modify the sensing and actuation signals, if the
plant is linear, time-invariant and known to the covert agent, then the agent
can use a parameterized feedback based structure to gain control of the plant
















Figure 12: Block diagram representing a covert attack.
attacks was provided by Pasqualetti et al. within their theoretical framework
as closed-loop attacks in which the output is chosen to cancel out the effect
on measurements of the state attack [124]. A block diagram related to this
definition is shown in Fig. 12: the attacker uses the signal Fw(t) to affect the
CPS while, at the same time, generating a signal Dw(t) in such a way that
the effect of Fw(t) on the measurements is erased. In this case, the attack
policy (3) can be particularized as: ũ(t) = u(t), ỹ(t) = y(t)+Dw(t) and S =
{Tyw(s)}, such that covert attacks are located on the system-sensors plane of
the impact space. A classification of covert attacks into two categories was
proposed by [311]: cybernetically covert attacks, which have low probability
to be detected by algorithms that monitor the softwares, communications
and data of the CPS; and physically covert attacks, which cause physical
effects that cannot be easily noticed or identified by a human observer.
The design of successful covert attacks against output tracking control of
CPSs was considered by [312] in which, based on whether the covert agent
has perfect model knowledge or no model knowledge, sufficient conditions un-
der which the output tracking control can be compromised successfully are
proposed. On the other hand, [212, 213] have proposed a two-loop structure
consisting of a covert loop and an attack loop. In particular, the covert loop
covers up the effect of the real attack on the physical plant by closely imi-
tating the expected behavior of the physical plant over a finite time window.
As exploratory attempts to establish the feasibility of machine learning-based
covert attacks, these works construct the attacks by applying least squares
support vector machine (LSSVM). Comprehensive examples of covert attacks
were provided in [313], namely an irrigation canal modeled by two partial dif-
ferential (Saint-Venant) equations [314] and a nonlinear DC motor. It was
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shown that the covert actions within the frequency range where the nominal
control system has low sensitivity will be hard to detect and that the better
the covert agent’s model of the plant, the easier it is for the covert agent to
remain undetected.
One approach to detect covert attacks is for the defender to gain more
knowledge of the system than the attacker. [315] proposed to perform the de-
tection by altering the system dynamics through the extension of the plant
with time-variant external states. As mentioned in Section 3.4, [309] con-
structed a time-varying modulation matrix to change the system inputs,
which allows detecting not only ZDAs, but covert attacks as well. The idea
of the detection scheme proposed by [214] is to obtain this superior knowl-
edge by extending the original plant with an auxiliary system. The auxiliary
system is a switched system which changes its dynamics at random time in-
stants, based on which a detection system which uses a switched Luenberger
observer is presented.
An alternative approach to mitigate issues related to covert attacks has
been suggested by [316]. Since covert attacks are designed based on an
accurate model of the attacked system, it is possible to use a randomly
switching controller to hinder the identification of the controller, so that the
model obtained by the attacker is imprecise or ambiguous. When deciding
for using this countermeasure, the existence of a tradeoff between mitigating
the effect of the attack and increasing the settling time of the system, which
is not necessarily a drawback, must be considered.
4. Illustrative examples
This section provides some examples taken from the literature concern-
ing the listed cyber attacks, which are used to show some of their relevant
properties and provide some deeper insight into possible defense mechanisms.
We would like to point out that this section is not meant to be exhaustive
from a descriptive viewpoint (several technical details are omitted, and the
interested reader is referred to the provided references). Moreover, due to
the review style of the paper, a comparison of different techniques is not
included.
4.1. Resilient control of a batch reactor under DoS using a robust design
The paper [138] has studied NCSs in the presence of DoS attacks that
prevent transmission over the communication network, and has characterized
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a critical threshold for the duration and frequency of DoS attacks under which
stability could be lost irrespective of the adopted controller.
The authors model the NCS as in (1)-(2), with E = I,D = F = 0, and
assume that transmission attempts are carried out periodically with some
constant period ∆. Due to DoS attacks, some transmission attempts may
fail, according to a general DoS model that constrains the attacker action in
time by posing limitations on the frequency of DoS attacks, i.e. an average
time interval between attacks τD, and a bound 1/T on the average fraction
of time over which communication is interrupted.
The control objective considered by [138] is to design the transmission
period ∆ and a controller K, possibly dynamic, in such a way that the
maximum value of 1/T + ∆/τD for which closed-loop stability is preserved
(resilient control) is as large as possible, in the sense of boundedness of the
signals when noise and disturbances are considered. The main contribution
is to show that when the process under control is observable, the closed-loop






< 1− (µ− 1) ∆
τD
(8)
where µ is the observability index of (C, eA∆).
The simulation results reported hereafter show the time response of a
state of an open-loop unstable process (a batch reactor system [138]) under
two DoS scenarios, where DoS signal equal to 1 corresponds to the attackless
situation. In the first scenario, the condition (8) is satisfied, such that the
overall closed-loop stability is kept. On the other hand, in the second sce-
nario, the condition (8) is not satisfied, and the system under DoS attacks
becomes unstable.
4.2. Replay attack detection in a multiple tank system
The paper [290] has presented a method for the detection of cyber at-
tacks based on a watermarking approach. The overall scheme that achieves
detection consists of: i) a decoupler, designed using a dynamical decoupling
technique named vector fitting, which guarantees that a sinusoidal signal in-
troduced in an input channel will affect only one output channel; ii) a bank
of band-pass filters, each one extracting from the output the signal content
at a possible frequency of the sinusoidal signature; and iii) a detection logic,
which makes a decision about whether an output channel is being affected
by a replay attack based on the energies of the band-pass filters’ outputs.
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Figure 13: Time response of the state x1 under DoS attacks (batch reactor).
Hereafter, we show the results obtained with the linearized model of a
multiple tank system, in a scenario where the first output (level measure-
ment of a tank) is affected by a replay attack starting from time 200 s. Fig.
14 shows the outputs of the band-pass filters (blue and yellow lines for zlow(t)
and zhigh(t), respectively) and the frequency profile of the time-varying sinu-
soidal signature (black line). Under no replay attack occurrence, the output
of the band-pass filter with the biggest energy is the one corresponding to
the instantaneous frequency ωσ(t) of the signature (zlow if ωσ has the low
frequency value, zhigh otherwise). On the other hand, under replay attack,
this does not occur anymore, which allows deciding about the presence of a
replay attack in the i-th output channel when σi(t) 6= σ̂i(t), where σ̂i(t) is
the estimation of σi(t) based on signals zlow and zhigh (see Fig. 15). The
reader is referred to [290] for technical details.
4.3. Security analysis and protection against FDIAs in a flight vehicle
The paper [318] has considered the problem of finding the conditions
under which a state estimator is not protected against FDIAs, in the sense
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Figure 14: Outputs of the band-pass filters and signature frequency (multiple tank system)
[289].
that there exist malicious attacks that can bypass χ2-based anomaly detectors
but still lead to unbounded estimation errors.
In particular, for an estimator (state observer) with estimation residual
z(k) and state estimate x̂(t), the system is insecure if the following two
conditions are satisfied simultaneously: i) for the difference ∆x̂(k) between





‖xa(k)− xo(k)‖ → ∞ (9)
and ii) for the estimation residual difference ∆z(k) = zo(k)−za(k) with zo(k),
za(k) denoting the attackless and attacked estimation residual, respectively,
‖∆z(k)‖ ≤M , where M represents the tolerant level of the χ2 detector. [318]
prove that, under the assumption that the attacker has perfect knowledge
about the system model and the ability to inject false data over all the
communication channels, the system is insecure if and only if ρ(A) ≥ 1,
where ρ(A) denotes the spectral radius of A. [318] also provide an algorithm
to construct the attack signal a(k) to add to the sensors’ measurements in
order to deviate the state estimation without affecting the residual reference.
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Figure 15: Comparison between the real signature frequencies σi(t) and the estimated
ones σ̂i(t) (multiple tank system).
For instance, for a moving vehicle with three sensors measuring the three
state variables (pitch angle, pitch rate and normal velocity) and one remote
estimator, it is shown that one of the eigenvalues of the state matrix lies in
1, which makes the vehicle insecure. For instance, Fig. 16 shows the attack
signal generated by Algorithm 1 in [318] which, exploiting the knowledge
about the system, injects the attack above all in the direction corresponding
to the marginally stable eigenvalue, although one should note that the values
of a2(k) and a3(k) do not equal zero, which shows that false data are injected
into all three communication channels.
Fig. 17 shows the state estimate difference ∆x̂(k) and the residual differ-
ence ∆z(k). As predicted from the theory, the sequence {∆x̂(k)} diverges to
∞, whereas the sequence {|∆z(k)|} is always less than the prescribed scalar
M . Hence, under attack the estimated trajectory of the vehicle deviates sig-
nificantly from the attackless scenario, albeit without triggering an alarm by
the χ2 detector.
Moreover, in case the assumption about the ability of the attacker to in-
ject false data over all the communication channels is relaxed, [318] provide
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Figure 16: Attack sequences (FDIA in a flight vehicle).
another theoretical results (involving checking the rank of an appropriate
matrix) that states under which conditions the estimator is secure. By ap-
plying this result, it can be proven that the state estimate system of the
flight vehicle is secure if the communication channel between the pitch angle
sensor and the estimator is protected.
4.4. ZDA and covert attack detection in a quadruple-tank process
The paper [308] has characterized the output-nulling property of a discrete-
time system with structure similar to (1)-(2), with E = I, D = 0 and F = B.
More specifically, they have demonstrated that any attack w(k) = Hz(k)
with z(k+ 1) = (A+BH)z(k) and (A+BF )V ⊆ V ⊆ Ker(C), where V is a
controlled invariant subspace for the system, is such that if z(0) = x(0) ∈ V ,
then y(k) = 0 ∀k ≥ 0. Indeed, Fig. 18 shows the simulated response under a
ZDA attack of the linearized model of the quadruple-tank process described
in [308], which is a system with two outputs and an unstable zero.
[308] have shown that in order to reveal a ZDA attack, appropriate mod-
ification should be introduced in the system’s matrices so that the attack
signal is no longer an output-nulling input. For instance, one might add an
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Figure 17: Estimation/residual differences (FDIA in a flight vehicle).





























Figure 18: ZDA attack in the linearized model of the quadruple-tank process.
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extra connection between tanks, which corresponds to a perturbation in the
system’s state matrix A. Alternatively, one can consider modification in the
input matrix B, e.g., by changing the actuator gains as B̃ = BW , where W
is a diagonal matrix unknown to the attacker, which can be interpreted as a
coding or encryption scheme performed by the actuator and the controller,
with W as the shared private key. For instance, Fig. 19 shows the output
responses obtained under the same conditions as the ones in Fig. 19, but as-
suming that a small perturbation in the matrix B is introduced (W = 0.987I)
at sample k = 200 s. It can be seen that thanks to this action, the attack
becomes visible in the outputs, which allows the successful detection.















Figure 19: ZDA in the linearized model of the quadruple-tank process (perturbation in
the matrix B).
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Notably, the same strategy is effective to detect covert attacks. For in-
stance, let us consider the case in which an attacker introduces sinusoidal
signals w(k) into the system, exploits its knowledge about the model to
predict the component of the state response xw(k) which corresponds to
the introduced attack signal, and modifies the output signals to remove
yw(k) = Cxw(k) from y(k) = Cx(k) in order to hide the physical sinusoidal
attack. For the sake of illustration, we will consider the attack to start from
sample k = 100, and the above described strategy to reveal attacks (pertur-
bation in the matrix B) to be implemented starting from sample k = 200.
The overall state and output responses are depicted in Fig. 20, and show that
the covert attack remains undetected until the perturbation in the matrix B
is introduced.
































Figure 20: Covert attack in the linearized model of the quadruple-tank process (pertur-
bation in the matrix B).
5. Future research directions
As systems and devices become more connected and the hardware and
software involved in modern applications grow more powerful and productive,
the risk due to malicious agents that use new technologies and techniques to
penetrate networks and systems to steal data, violate the privacy and take
remote control of assets, continues to increase. For this reason, there is a
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never-ending quest for developing new solutions for addressing the cyber-
security challenges. Based on the existing research on cybersecurity, some
works have discussed open issues and future directions for further research
in the field.
As a consequence of the Executive Order 13636 Improving Critical In-
frastructure Cybersecurity, issued by Former President of the USA Barack
Obama in 2013, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
created the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, developed in collaboration with
the industry, to provide guidance to organizations to better manage and re-
duce cybersecurity risks. In 2017, NIST produced a Roadmap [319], which
provides a description of anticipated future activities related to this frame-
work, focusing on 12 high-priority areas for research and development, listed
below:
1. Confidence Mechanisms that, based on conformity assessment, pro-
vide means for determining the sufficiency and efficacy of organizational
cybersecurity risk management, considering product, service, and sys-
tems conformity;
2. Cyber-Attack Lifecycle, which involves a sequence of events that
a malicious agent undertakes to penetrate successfully a network for
non-authorized purposes. It is important to approach cybersecurity
from this perspective by identifying threat sources, threat events, and
vulnerabilities that predispose an environment to be attacked. For this
reason, it is important that cyber threat information is available in the
form of threat and vulnerability metrics that support decision-making;
3. Cybersecurity Workforce, which is required to meet the unique cy-
bersecurity needs of critical infrastructure. As threats, vulnerabilities,
and technology evolve, the cybersecurity workforce should continuously
adapt to design, develop, implement, maintain and improve the nec-
essary cybersecurity procedures and mechanisms within critical infras-
tructure environments;
4. Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management, which is the process of
identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with the dis-
tributed and interconnected nature of technology product and service
supply chains;
5. Federal Agency Cybersecurity Alignment, which allows estab-
lishing cybersecurity recommendations and requirements for critical
infrastructures at national level;
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6. Governance and Enterprise Risk Management, that aligns the
efforts of public and private sectors in terms of cybersecurity;
7. Identity Management, that faces current risk challenges, due to the
using and adoption of new identity technologies as, e.g., biometric tech-
nology;
8. International Aspects, which relate to the lack of a common lan-
guage or taxonomy among international entities relative to cybersecu-
rity. Since many countries are developing their own standards, inter-
operability at international level is a challenging process. International
collaboration and alignment, together with the development of globally
accepted standards, guidelines and practices regarding cybersecurity,
would lead to a more effective and efficient utilization of resources;
9. Measuring Cybersecurity, by developing reliable ways to measure
risk and effectiveness of cybersecurity mechanisms;
10. Privacy Engineering, that deals with how to design information tech-
nologies and systems that protect individuals’ privacy in an increasingly
connected world;
11. Referencing Techniques, which has been added to the Roadmap
to address the relationship of one set of cybersecurity requirements,
controls, or outcomes, to another;
12. Small Business Awareness and Resources, due to the fact that a
vulnerability common to many small businesses could pose a threat to
a bigger economic base.
Notably, addressing present challenges in the field of cybersecurity is
highly prioritized not only by the USA, but also by other entities, such as
the European Union through H2020 research projects, e.g., Hermeneut6. As
a matter of fact, the EU Commission has launched calls to support the cre-
ation of a cybersecurity competence network, with the goal of developing and
implementing a common cybersecurity research and innovation roadmap7.
As mentioned by [113], four points require major attention when research
on cybersecurity is tackled from a control-oriented perspective:
1. Risk assessment: assessing how a risk impacts cybersecurity will




and quantitative approaches to vulnerability assessment are found to
be in urgent need. For example, in order to assess and decrease the
risk of threats, [104] proposed a risk management cycle which contains
risk analysis, treatment, and monitoring.
2. Attack modeling and design: assumptions in existing works about
the presence of noise and uncertainty, and about the knowledge of the
system trajectory, should be reconsidered. The attackers’ intentions
and behaviors can be further studied in order to design effective defense
mechanisms. According to [292], some aspects regarding the attacker
with limited capabilities and specific goal requires future investigation.
Generally, the attackers have limited capabilities, and they have access
only to approximate models of some subsystems, and it is not clear if
and how undetectable attacks can be cast [124].
3. Counter-attack strategies: how to design effective counter measures
and detection algorithms for all known attacks, in order to degrade their
impacts and minimize the damage to the system, is an open issue. In
addition, how to reduce the economic cost of security mitigation and
coordinate different security measures still need further study. The
defense mechanisms have been classified in three different aspects [132]:
prevention, detection and mitigation. Moreover, isolation can also be
added, see for example [100, 124, 320].
4. Testbed and validation: with the development of new approaches
to cybersecurity, testbeds are needed in order to evaluate the emerg-
ing theories, methods and techniques. These testbeds should provide
a practical environment to conduct some attack-defense experimenta-
tions. In this sense, [321] has presented a benchmark for the detection
and isolation of cyber attacks, based on a two tank system, in which
a malicious attacker wants to remain hidden while stealing water, by
altering the signals coming from the sensors. Moreover, [322] has intro-
duced an open source Matlab toolbox called epanetCPA for modelling
the hydraulic response of water distribution system for physical at-
tacks. Similarly, the SWaT testbed [323] is based on a water treatment
plant, and has been used to understand the impact of cyber & physical
attacks. On the other hand, the Matpower Polish system, which is an
open source Matlab-based power system simulation package, is so far
the most used tool for assessing security in smart grids [324].
Furthermore, [224] has discussed about the limitations of existing ap-
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proaches and proposed several challenging issues that deserve further re-
search, some of which are resumed hereafter: the need for taking into account
time-varying or nonlinear behaviors; how to make effective secure control
schemes that satisfy hard constraints on security; to take into account that
a system could be affected by multiple attacks; to fuse attack detection and
resilient control in a uniform framework, which would lead to significant im-
provements in the security performance; to co-design the system parameters
by considering both the security requirements and the resource constraints
(communication bandwidth, limited energy, etc.).
6. Conclusions
The need for enhancing the security of networked control systems and
cyber-physical systems has brought more and more attention to the topic of
cyber attacks. This paper has presented a bibliographical review from the
control-oriented perspective, which discusses some references found in the
literature, thus providing an overall picture of historical, current, and future
developments in this area. First, the security objectives and attack models
are introduced. Then, a set of attacks considered in the literature are charac-
terized introducing the proposed detection mechanisms and remedial actions.
Later, some examples have been provided in order to show some features and
characteristics of the described attacks and detection mechanisms. Finally,
some future research directions in the cyberacttack field are described from
a general and control-oriented perspective. In particular, the high-priority
areas for research and development contained in the Roadmap for Improv-
ing Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity of the USA National Institute of
Standards and Technology have been described. Moreover, four points that
require major attention when cybersecurity is tackled from a control-oriented
perspective have been discussed (risk assessment, attack modeling and de-
sign, counter-attack strategies and testbed/validation), and the limitations
of existing approaches and challenging issues that require further research
have been mentioned.
Due to the huge amount of published papers (more than 2000 if we con-
sidered only the year 2017), the review is in no way meant to be exhaustive.
We feel that we have done our best to provide to the readers a list of useful
references, and whenever specific reviews about some topic were available,
a suggestion to look at those reviews, and the references therein, has been
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provided. However, in spite of our best effort, many publications could not
be included, and we would like to apologize in advance for any omission.
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